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THE EFFECT OF LEGALIZED ABORTION ON WRONGFUL
LIFE ACTIONS
S. STOCKWELL STOUTAMIRE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court declared in Roe v.
Wade,' that a fetus at any gestational age is not a legal person and
consequently its life is not entitled to constitutional protection. Fe-
tal life was weighed against maternal health, broadly defined by
the Court to include the stigma of unwed motherhood and the
stress of child raising, and found to be of lesser importance. A
woman and her physician were given sole discretion to decide
whether fetal life should continue. The Court apparently did not
foresee that the right to abortion would be exercised as a mother's
sole prerogative. Its scheme provided that the decision to abort
would be exercised by the physician in consultation with his pa-
tient.s After consultation, the physician was to exercise his discre-
tion in determining whether abortion was in the best interest of
the mother,' much in the same manner as he exercises his judg-
ment whether extraordinary life-prolonging measures are appropri-
ate in certain circumstances of terminal illness.' Unfortunately,
medical literture has discouraged physicians from exercising their
judgment in the area of abortion. Doctors incorrectly caution their
colleagues that the Court gave women the right to abort and that
physicians should not attempt to influence that decision. Conse-
1. 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973).
2. Id. at 153.
3. Id. at 163. Interestingly, the law is willing to use current medical standards in defining
death, the point at which legal protection ends, see, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
7180-82 (West Supp. 1980), and the medical community has pushed for this result. See Ad
Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, A Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J.
AM. MED. Ass'N 337 (1968). By placing the abortion decision with the doctor, the Court
accomplished the result it sought. The Court, however, left a trail of ambiguity as it de-
clined to attempt a definition of life or leave that definition to accepted medical standards.
410 U.S. at 159.
The morality of abortion under traditional common law was based upon when
pregnancy was known to exist, which at one time meant quickening. By the same
common law logic, we are able through biochemistry to pick up [the fetus's] trans-
mitted message announcing its existence ... when it imbeds in the wall of the
uterus.
B. NATHANSON, ABORTING AuMCA 206 (1979). Furthermore, the criteria used to determine
death-pulse and brain waves-are detectable in the fetus by day 18 and day 43, respec-
tively. Id. at 198, 200.
4. 410 U.S. at 163.
5. See 8 FLA. ST. U.L. Rzv. 111 (1980).
6. See Fletcher, Ethics and Amniocentesis for Fetal Sex Identification, 301 Niw ENG. J.
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quently, the exercise of discretion by the physician has in most in-
stances disappeared, and despite the Court's holding in Roe, wo-
men are deciding unilaterally whether to have abortions.
With the recent recognition of a new tort action, the freedom of
the doctor or the mother to exercise their judgment as to abortion
may be in jeopardy. A recent California decision granted a child a
cause of action against the physician for negligence in allowing the
child to be born. The court indicated in dicta that no reason ex-
isted for denying a child the same cause of action against his par-
ents. Such an action brought by an infant for damages suffered by
it due to the failure of parents or doctors to prevent or terminate
its life is characterized by most courts' and by this author as a
wrongful life action. Except for instances of illegitimacy, these
cases are generally brought against the physician for failing to ex-
ercise due care in a sterilization procedure, failure to advise of the
availability of amniocentesis, failure to advise of or properly per-
form an abortion, or negligent genetic counseling. 9 Many of these
suits are brought by children suffering from some deformity which
was detectable in utero or genetically predictable.10 But some ac-
tions are brought by healthy children who were simply unwanted."
The California decision allowing the child's cause of action was
predicated in large part on the legalization of abortion as evi-
denced by the court's reference to changes in public policy,
changes in the law, and the "monumental implications" of Roe.12 If
this conceptual basis is sound and if other courts had followed it, a
great difference in analysis might be expected in the wrongful-life
cases brought before and after the legalization of abortion. Actu-
ally, however, wrongful life actions have been rejected largely for
MED. 550, 551-52 (1979); Powledge & Fletcher, Guidelines for Ethical, Social and Legal
Issues in Prenatal Diagnosis, 300 NEw ENG. J. MD. 168, 172 (1979).
7. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
8. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Zepeda v. Zepeda,
190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v. Cosgrove,
227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
9. See, e.g., Elliott v. Brown, 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978) (improperly performed vasec-
tomy); Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (improperly performed
abortion); Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967) (doctors failed to inform the par-
ents of the possible effects of the mother's German measles).
10. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967); Park v. Chessin, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1977), modified and aff'd, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
11. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (Ill. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Williams v.
State, 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (1966).
12. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486-87 (Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
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the same reasons in both eras: a difficulty in measuring damages, a
public policy favoring life, and/or a belief that such actions should
be established legislatively rather than judicially."3 Rarely do the
courts in these cases discuss the possible impact of the legalization
of abortion: that doctors and parents now have a quick legal solu-
tion for any wrong that has been done to the fetus and failure to
use that solution may be an affirmative defense in wrongful life
actions."'
This comment will examine the wrongful life actions brought
before and after the legalization of abortion and compare the ratio-
nales used by the various courts. Abortion as a defense to a claim
of wrongful life will also be discussed. The cases examined in this
paper involve only those brought on behalf of the infant. Many
courts refer to malpractice actions brought by the parents as a
wrongful life action but these are not included here. Many of the
cases discussed involved actions brought by both the infant and
the parent but only that portion of the opinion addressing the in-
fant's alleged right of nonexistence will be discussed. All of these
cases came before the courts on motions to dismiss or motions for
summary judgment so the opinions are limited only to a determi-
nation of whether a cause of action has been pled.
II. WRONGFUL LIFE AND ILLEGAL ABORTION
The case widely recognized as the first wrongful life action
brought in the United States was also one of the few such actions
ever brought against a parent. Zepeda v. Zepeda1 5 involved a tort
suit based on the theory of wrongful life brought on behalf of an
infant against his father for causing him to be born illegitimate.
The plaintiff sought damages for deprivation of the right to be le-
gitimate, to have a normal home, to have a legal father and an
inheritance, and for the stigma attached to bastardy. The trial
court dismissed the suit for failure to state a cause of action and
the plaintiff appealed.1 6
The appellate court framed the issue in terms of whether a tort
13. See, e.g., Stills v. Gratton, 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Zepeda v.
Zepeda, 190 N.E.2d 849 (11. Ct. App. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964); Gleitman v.
Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967); Becker v. Schwartz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978); Karlsons
v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (App. Div. 1977); Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 233
N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
14. But see Karlsons v. Guerinot, 394 N.Y.S.2d 933, 937-38 (App. Div. 1977).
15. 190 N.E.2d 849 (III. App. Ct. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964).
16. Id. at 851.
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could be inflicted simultaneously with conception. At common law,
birth was required as a prerequisite for an action in tort although
other branches of the law, such as property and inheritance, recog-
nized legal rights at conception.The court stated, "The law of torts
has been hesitant in recognizing what medical science has long
known, that life begins at the moment of conception, and what
theology has longer taught, that from the moment of conception
every human being has the rights of a human person. ' 17 the
Zepeda court considered wrongful life actions to be an extension of
prenatal tort actions. The latter had moved the time at which
rights attach from the point of birth back to the point of viability,
if the plaintiff were later born alive: "However, the exact time
when viability occurs is uncertain. No medical authority can say
with accuracy just at what moment a child can live when separated
from its mother. . . The law has slowly come to realize these
uncertainties and the viability test is being abandoned." 18 The
court concluded that no cause of action had been pled for two rea-
sons. First, the plaintiff failed to aver the necessary prerequisites
for a cause of action based on mental suffering and defamation.
Second, even a legitimate child has no right to a normal home. 1'
However, the court did consider bastardy to be an injury recog-
nized by state law. In this regard the court stated: "[T]he quintes-
sence of his complaint is that he was born and that he is. Herein
lies the intrinsic difficulty of this case, a difficulty which gives rise
to this question: are there overriding legal, social, judicial or other
considerations which should preclude recognition of a cause of ac-
tion?"'20 The court believed that the resolution of this question
would have such far-reaching effects that it should be addressed by
the legislature and not by the judiciary.'1
The next wrongful life action arose in New York and was also
predicated on bastardy. In Williams v. State," the plaintiff com-
17. Id. at 852. Roe v. Wade would later disabuse courts of this belief.
18. Id. at 853. The viability test would later be resurrected by the Supreme Court in
Roe, 410 U.S. at 160, although as used by Roe, it is a concept unknown to obstetrics. The
Roe Court placed viability at 24 weeks, but medical discussion of viability is based on
weight in grams and is constantly being pushed back by advances in medical technology. B.
NATHANSON, supra note 3, at 207-08.
19. 190 N.E.2d at 855, 856, 859.
20. Id. at 857.
21. Id. at 859. Slawek v. Stroh, 215 N.W.2d 9 (Wis. 1974), included a cross-claim for
wrongful life by a child against a parent. The Slawek court also believed the ramifications
were such that the legislature and not the courts should define public policy in this area. Id.
at 22.
22. 276 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
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plained of being born out of wedlock to a mentally defective
mother. The defendant in the suit was the institution in which the
mother was housed and in which the assault on the mother oc-
curred resulting in plaintiff's conception and birth. As in Zepeda,
plaintiff here sought damages for deprivation of property rights,
normal childhood and home life, and proper parental care, as well
as for the stigma attached to bastardy.2 The court concluded that
such a suit was impossible to entertain since "[b]eing born under
one set of circumstances rather than another .. .is not a suable
wrong.' 4 In a concurring opinion, Judge Keating recognized that
the measurement of damages in a wrongful life action required an
assessment of the value of life vis a vis nonexistence, rather than
an assessment of the value of life as it is for the plaintiff and life as
the plaintiff would have preferred, i.e., legitimate. Had there been
no wrong (the assault complained of), there would have been
neither legitimate nor illegitimate life."
The most famous of the early wrongful life cases and the first to
wrestle with the unavailability of abortion was Gleitman v. Cos-
grove.' The plaintiff in Gleitman sued for money damages for
birth defects caused by German measles contracted by plaintiff's
mother and for failure of the doctors to advise the mother about
the possibility of defects so that the mother could have aborted the
plaintiff.' 7 The court stated that conception sets in motion biologi-
cal processes which if undisturbed will produce a person; conse-
quently, it was unnecessary to decide whether an unborn child was
a person with the attendant right to be free from injury.' 8 In this
case, though, defendants did not disrupt the process. Rather, de-
fendants' allegedly negligent conduct was in preventing plaintiff's
"termination" before birth, an act assumed by the court to be le-
gally possible.29 This court found no cognizable action at law due
to the difficulty measuring damages:
The right to life is inalienable in our society. A court cannot say
what defects should prevent an embryo from being allowed life
.... A child need not be perfect to have a worthwhile life.
... It may have been easier for the mother and less expensive
23. Id. at 886.
24. Id. at 887.
25. Id. at 888.
26. 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967).
27. Id. at 690.
28. Id. at 691-92. Roe would later follow the same route to the opposite conclusion.
29. Id. at 692.
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for the father to have terminated the life of their child while he
was an embryo, but these alleged detriments cannot stand against
the preciousness of the single human life .... 30
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Jacobs expressed the view that a
judicial system, which daily evaluates the monetary value of such
indefinite injuries such as pain and suffering could likewise evalu-
ate the damages in a case such as this.-
Another much-cited case involving German measles came out of
New York. In Stewart v. Long Island College Hospital,2 the in-
fant plaintiff sued the hospital for negligence and malpractice in
failing to perform a therapeutic abortion to prevent the plaintiff's
handicapped life. Plaintiff's handicaps were allegedly caused by
the German measles contracted early in the mother's pregnancy.
The court found that the plaintiff had no remedy against a defen-
dant whose only offense was a failure to consign the plaintiff to
oblivion: "The ultimate wrong that can be committed is to cause
another person's death. It would be the antithesis of these princi-
ples to require the defendant hospital to respond in damages to
the infant plaintiff because it did not prevent the infant's birth."3
These early claims of wrongful life were rejected due to the diffi-
culty in measuring damages, the errors in common law pleading, or
the impropriety of judicial action. None of the courts found it nec-
essary to struggle with the issue of when life began or its value. Yet
some of these early courts appeared to recognize the value of life
even at its earliest stages. The Zepeda court stated, "[M]edical sci-
ence has long known, that life begins at the moment of conception,
and . . .from the moment of conception every human being has
the rights of a human person. ' ' " The Gleitman court added, "The
right to life is inalienable in our soceity. . . . We are not talking
here about the breeding of prize cattle."35 Human life at whatever
stage of development was considered precious by these courts.
In 1973, however, the inalienable right to life became something
less than inalienable with the legalization of abortion. In Roe v.
Wade, the Constitution was construed to contain a right to privacy
protecting a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy.36 The
30. Id. at 693.
31. Id. at 704.
32. 296 N.Y.S.2d 41, 43 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
33. Id. at 46.
34. 190 N.E.2d at 852.
35. 227 A.2d at 693.
36. 410 U.S. at 152-54.
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Court identified three state interests which had in the past been
offered to support anti-abortion legislation: (1) to discourage illicit
sexual conduct; (2) to protect the health of the woman; and (3) to
protect the life of the fetus on the "theory" that new human life is
present from the moment of conception. 7 Although the Court cor-
rectly noted that the Constitution does not specifically mention a
right to privacy, it concluded that the right to privacy emerging
from either the fourteenth or ninth amendments was broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision whether to terminate her preg-
nancy." So deciding, the Court then addressed claims that the fe-
tus was a person whose right to life was protected by the four-
teenth amendment. The Court could find nowhere in the
Constitution a definition of the word person; however, "citizen," it
noted, was defined as a person "born... in the United States." 9
In other places where the word "person" was used, it was obviously
in a postnatal context. This fact, in conjunction with the observa-
tion that 19th century abortion practices were far less restricted
than those in 1973, persuaded the Court that the word "person" in
the fourteenth amendment did not include the unborn.40 Further-
more, the Court found it unnecessary to determine when life be-
gins, noting that if the trained minds of medicine, philosophy, and
theology could not come to a consensus on this question, then the
Court certainly was in no position to postulate an answer.4 1 Corre-
spondingly, neither could the State of Texas override the rights of
the pregnant woman by adopting a particular theory of life.'2 With
this groundwork laid, the Court established a scheme limiting a
state's power to regulate or prohibit abortion. In the first three
months of pregnancy the state has no legitimate interest in the
abortion issue. During the second trimester, the state develops a
compelling interest in the health of the mother. Not until the last
trimester does a state interest in the life of the fetus emerge and
then only to the extent that this interest does not conflict with the
37. Id. at 147-52.
38. Id. at 153.
39. Id. at 157 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1).
40. Id. at 157-58.
41. Id. at 159. As an example, the Court further noted that the Stoics, the Jews, and
most Protestant denominations believe that life begins only upon a live birth. Conversely,
the common law focused upon "quickening" as the point of recognizable life. In addition,
modern scientists vary in their focus upon conception, live birth, or the point of viability as
the instant when life begins. Id. at 160.
42. Id. at 162.
19811
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health of the mother.48 The health of the mother was defined by
the Court to include the considerations of the taxing burden of
child care and the stigma of unwed motherhood."
In this way-by ignoring information available from modern ob-
stetrics, gynecology, and embryology and by relying on 19th cen-
tury attitudes toward the fetus and abortion-the Court caused
the unborn to lose their legal personhood.4 5 The rights of the au-
thor and readers do not innately exist, but rather they exist only
because those around us care enough to see to it that we have
them. Daniel Callahan, director of the Institute of Society, Ethics
and the Life Sciences, points out that to state without substantia-
tion (as did Justice Blackmun in Roe)"e that the rights of the fetus
should be left to personal conscience while the rights of the mother
are proper matters for legislation is to stack the deck against the
unborn. 7
III. THE LEGALIZATION OF ABORTION
The slippery slide from the first recognition of a right to privacy
to the legalization of abortion was begun in Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.4s There, the Court held that enforcing the birth control ban in
issue would have required outrageous government prying into the
privacy of the home. Although the act of conception may take
place in the privacy of the home, abortion is a public matter regis-
tered with the government by the completion of a fetal death cer-
tificate. 9 It should be realized that not all invasions of privacy are
bad: the privacy of the white majority is invaded as they are re-
quired to respect the rights of the black minority and the privacy
of parents is invaded as they are forbidden by law from physically
abusing their born children. But under most laws in the United
States, birth is the socially significant event which permits rights
to accrue, although the only change which occurs in the fetus at
43. Id. at 163-66.
44. Id. at 153.
45. Although absence of brain wave and circulatory activity are indicators of the end of
life, the significance of their presence during fetal life is largely ignored. Electrocardio-
graphic evidence has been acquired from embryos as young as six-weeks old while elec-
troencephalographic recordings have noted human brain activity in embryos at eight weeks.
Nathanson, Deeper Into Abortion, 291 Nzw ENG. J. MED. 1189, 1189 (1974).
46. See 410 U.S. at 154-55, 164.
47. CALLAHAN, Abortion: Some Ethical Issues, in ABORTiON, SOCMETY AND Tm LAw
(1973).
48. 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
49. B. NATHANSON, supra note 3, at 192, 212.
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that time is breathing. "All other functions of a newborn baby,
even crying, may occur within the womb." 50
After Griswold, the Supreme Court in Roe greatly extended the
newly discovered right to privacy to encompass a woman's right to
abort. As expressed by Archibald Cox, an authority on constitu-
tional law at Harvard, the Roe decision
fails even to consider what I would suppose to be the most com-
pelling interest of the State in prohibiting abortion: the interest
in maintaining that respect for the paramount sanctity of human
life which has always been at the centre of western civilization,
not merely by guarding "life" itself, however defined, but by safe-
guarding the penumbra, whether at the beginning, through some
overwhelming disabilty of mind or body, or at death.51
The value placed on life has become a subjective determination
which depends on the whims and personal desires of each individ-
ual; life no longer has intrinsic worth. How did this change in
public policy affect wrongful life actions?
IV. WRONGFUL LIFE AND LEGAL ABORTON
Until June of 1980, courts continued to deny a cause of action
based on wrongful life despite the implications of Roe. The prob-
lem of measuring damages plagued the courts and some courts
continued to emphasize a need for a deep-seated respect for life.5
The court in Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital" phrased the
claim there in a straightforward manner: "The plaintiffs allege that
as a result of the negligent diagnosis by the defendants. . .Tanya
Dumer was not aborted, to her personal injury .... "55 No cause
of action on behalf of the daughter was found because the damages
were considered immeasurable." The survival of public policy
favoring life of the unborn was apparent in Judge Hansen's dis-
senting opinion in which he expressed the belief that the parents'
cause of action should also be denied. "The parent's cause of ac-
tion is based on the claimed denial of their opportunity to termi-
50. Id. at 210.
51. A. Cox, THE RoLE O THE SuPRAME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 53 (1976).
52. B. NATHANSON, supra note 3, at 253.
53. See Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 486 (Dist. Ct. App.
1980).
54. 233 N.W.2d 372 (Wis. 1975).
55. Id. at 374.
56. Id. at 376.
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nate the life of their child while he was an embryo. Public policy is
involved . . . . 'It is basic to the human condition to seek life and
hold on to it however heavily burdened.' "57
Stills v. Gratton" was apparently the first case brought by a
healthy child in which doctors were sued for performing an abor-
tion in a negligent manner. A therapeutic abortion was performed
on plaintiff's mother in July, 1969. Despite this fact, plaintiff was
born a healthy baby boy in January, 1970, and was characterized
as "a joy to his mother."" The infant's pleadings alleged only that
he was born out of wedlock and that this, for various reasons, af-
fected him to his detriment. On the authority of Williams and
Gleitman and without discussion of Roe the court concluded that
the trial court's nonsuit was proper.60
In Karlsons v. Guerinot,"1 the mongoloid plaintiff argued that
liberalization of abortion laws invalidated the prior holdings in
New York to the effect that birth was not an actionable wrong.
The court rejected this argument stating that prior actions had
been rejected not because abortion was not legally available but
because the actions did not involve a injury legally compensable in
court.62 The court concluded that judicial recognition of such a
cause of action was impossible since damages could not be
measured."'
The Roe decision almost had its first impact on wrongful life ac-
tions in New York in 1977. In Park v. Chessin," an action was
brought on behalf of a child who had died at age two of polycystic
kidney disease. The doctors were charged with "wanton and gross
disregard of known medical fact" in that they advised the parents
that after the birth and death of a prior child with the same dis-
ease, the chances of having a future baby with the same disease
was "practically nil" although the disease was known to be
57. Id. at 378 (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967)).
58. 127 Cal. Rptr. 652 (Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
59. Id. at 653-56.
60. Id. at 656-57.
61. 394 N.Y.S.2d 933 (App. Div. 1977).
62. Id. at 937-38.
63. Id. at 938.
64. 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1977), modified and a/I'd, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). See
also Becker v. Schwartz, 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1977), modified and alI'd, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), a companion case brought by a mongoloid child on the ground that the
physicians were negligent in not advising her mother of the risk of Down's Syndrome in
children born to women over 35 years of age, in order that the mother could have aborted
the plaintiff.
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hereditary.6
The trial court in Park found that the child was a potential be-
ing with essential reality at the time of the alleged misrepresenta-
tion and hence belonged to a class which the defendant could fore-
see and had in contemplation when the misrepresentation was
made. 6 Furthermore, according to the trial court, the difficulty of
measuring damages or the lack of precedent should not be an arbi-
trary bar to recognition of the action.6 7 In affirmance, the appellate
division stated:
[Djecisional law must keep pace with expanding technological, ec-
onomic and social change. Inherent in the abolition of the statu-
tory ban on abortion ... is a public policy consideration which
gives potential parents the right . . . not to have a child....
The breach of this right may also be said to be tortious to the
fundamental right of a child to be born as a whole, functional
human being."
Thus, this reasoning would appear to make Roe the foundation of
a theory of law allowing children a cause of action against anyone,
including their parents, for interfering with their right to be born
without any defects.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Titone noted that despite the fact
that penal sanctions had been removed for abortion, the public
policy of the state was one which favored life over nonlife and
birth over nonbirth or nonconception. Further, he believed that
the recognition of wrongful life actions should lie with the legisla-
ture which previously had acknowledged wrongful death actions."
He stated, "Essentially, a claim for 'wrongful death' is based on
the premise that a life was terminated which should not have been
terminated, whereas a claim for 'wrongful life' or 'wrongful birth' is
predicated on the premise that a life has evolved which should not
have evolved. '70 He characterized the action by the majority as not
"keeping pace with social change, but rather [as] rushing into the
adoption of a radical social concept having no basis in law, namely,
that there may be a suable wrong stemming solely from the exis-
65. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 111.
66. Park v. Chessin, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204, 208 (Sup. Ct. 1976), modified and aff'd, 400
N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1977), modified and afl'd, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
67. Id. at 211.
68. 400 N.Y.S.2d at 114.
69. Id. at 116-17.
70. Id. at 116.
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tence of life." 71
The appellate division's holding was appealed to the court of ap-
peals on a certified question, consolidated with Becker v.
Schwartz, 2 and modified. That court found two fatal flaws in
plaintiffs' claims which had been initiated on behalf of their in-
fants for wrongful life. First, the infants apparently had not suf-
fered any legally cognizable injury since there was no precedent for
recognition of the appellate division's finding that the child had a
right to be born as a whole functional human being. The court
stated that:
Whether it is better never to have been born at all than to have
been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly
to be left to the philosophers and the theologians. Surely the law
can assert no competence to resolve the issue, particularly in view
of the very nearly uniform high value which the law and mankind
has placed on human life, rather than its absence.... Would
claims be honored, assuming the breach of an identifiable duty,
for less than a perfect birth? And by what standard or by whom
would perfection be defined?7
8
The second flaw identified by the court of appeals was the diffi-
culty in measuring damages which would place the injured party in
the position he would have occupied but for the negligence of the
defendant.7' The majority concluded that "[riecognition of so
novel a cause of action, requiring, as it must, creation of a hypo-
thetical formula for the measurement of an infant's damages is
best reserved for legislative, rather than judicial, attention."75
In a concurring opinion Judge Fuchsberg reduced the issue to a
more fundamental level: whether the plaintiff children would have
preferred not to have been born at all. Recognizing that the answer
to that question could not be known, Judge Fuchsberg found it
unnecessary to proceed to the question regarding the uncertainty
of damages.76 Judge Wachtler, dissenting in part, noted the diffi-
culty in the application of proximate cause.
71. Id.
72. 400 N.Y.S.2d 119 (App. Div. 1977), modified and affd 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978).
73. Baker v. Schwartz, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978). The value of life expressed here
appears to be much greater than that expressed by the Supreme Court in Roe. See 410 U.S.
157-59.
74. 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
75. Id. at 901.
76. Id. at 903.
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The theory is that if the doctor had advised the parents of the
risk of bearing a handicapped child, and the availability of tests
for detecting the disorder, the mother would have consented to
the tests, the tests would have revealed the defect, the parents or
at least the mother would have decided to have an abortion, the
abortion would have been successfully performed and thus the
child would not have been forced to lead a life of hardship.7
In Judge Wachtler's opinion, the cause was too attenuated for a
finding of negligence. Furthermore, the question of whether the in-
fant could have been legally aborted was considered by Judge
Wachtler to be of "no practical significance" since there was no
right not to be born and hence no right cognizable at law which the
defendant could have violated. 8
Modification by the New York Court of Appeals did not occur
before the Alabama Supreme Court had to struggle with the rea-
soning set forth by the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Divi-
sion, in Park. In Elliott v. Brown,79 a deformed infant sued for
negligent performance of her father's vasectomy. The trial court
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and the supreme
court affirmed on the theory that although women possess the
right to have abortions in certain circumstances, there is no legal
right not to be born.80 The Elliot court distinguished the appellate
division's decision in Park on the ground that the state of the art
in vasectomy surgery was not as advanced as in genetic counseling.
A medically performed vasectomy was no guarantee that a child
would not be born deformed.8 " As for the dicta in Park that there
is a right to be born whole, the Elliott court queried, "[W]hat cri-
teria would be used to determine the degree of deformity necessary
to state a claim for relief. We decline to pronounce judgment in the
imponderable area of nonexistence. '8 2
New Jersey revisited its pre-Roe Gleitman decision in Berman v.
Allan,83 where a mongoloid plaintiff sued the doctors for failing to
follow accepted medical standards when they did not inform plain-
tiff's mother about amniocentesis. This medical procedure would
have revealed plaintiff's mongoloid condition and given her mother
77. Id. 904-05.
78. Id. at 905.
79. 361 So. 2d 546 (Ala. 1978).
80. Id. at 548.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. 404 A.2d 8, 10 (N.J. 1979).
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an opportunity to abort the plaintiff. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment to defendants on the authority of Gleitman."
While appeal was pending before the appellate division, the su-
preme court certified the case on its own motion.86 After reviewing
that portion of Gleitman which had denied a cause of action due
to the difficulty of measuring damages, the court concluded that
this difficulty alone would no longer be a bar to a cause of action."6
The court eloquently concluded, however, that no cause of action
yet existed and that the plaintiff had suffered no legally cognizable
damage:
One of the most deeply held beliefs of our society is that
life-whether experienced with or without a major physical hand-
icap-is more precious than nonlife .... The federal constitu-
tion characterizes life as one of three fundamental rights of which
no man can be deprived without due process of law .... No-
where in these documents is there to be found an indication that
the lives of persons suffering from physical handicaps are to be
less cherished than those of non-handicapped human beings.
No man is perfect. Each of us suffers from some aliments or
defects, whether major or minor, which make impossible partici-
pation in all the activities the world has to offer. But our lives are
not thereby rendered less precious than those of others whose de-
fects are less pervasive or less severe.
Notwithstanding her affliction with Down's Syndrome, Sharon,
by virtue of her birth, will be able to love and be loved and to
experience happiness and pleasure-emotions which are truly the
essence of life .... To rule otherwise would require us to disa-
vow the basic assumption upon which our society is based. This
we cannot do. 7
The State of Pennsylvania addressed a claim of wrongful life in
Speck v. Finegold.M Plaintiff's father and two siblings suffered
from neurofibromatosis, a crippling disease of the fibrous struc-
tures of the nerves. After the father had an unsuccessful vasectomy
and the plaintiff's mother had an unsuccessful abortion, plaintiff
84. Id. at 11.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id. at 12-13 (citations omitted).
88. 408 A.2d 496 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979).
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was born with neurofibromatosis.9 The lower court denied plain-
tiff's claim on grounds that the action was against public policy
and that damages were so speculative as to be immeasurable.90 On
appeal, the superior court declined to frame the issue in terms of
the sanctity of life: "The last vestige of this public policy view was
eliminated in two cases decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States [referring to Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v.
Wade]."91 As to other policy reasons precluding recovery such as
the remoteness of the injury, the possibility of fraudulent claims,
and the snowball effect, the court found that judicial processes
were capable of discerning credible claims. Nevertheless, the court
found that the child's claims were not cognizable at law because
there was no precedent that a child has a right to be born healthy
and there was no way to measure the difference between impaired
life and no life."
In a concurring and dissenting opinion Judge Spaeth noted that
if the plaintiff's neurofibromatosis had been caused by the doctors,
then the infant may have had a cause of action, but without the
causal link, the infant could not maintain its action against the
defendants.93
It was not until June, 1980, that a court took Roe to its furthest
possible extreme by stating dicta that those who are unqualified to
be born either due to deformity or unwantedness can sue for their
injury.9 In Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories," the issue con-
fronting the court was what remedy, if any, was available to a ge-
netically defective child born as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence in conducting genetic tests of the plaintiff's parents. Plaintiff
was born with Tay-Sachs, a degenerative disease of the nervous
system characterized by loss of vision, mental underdevelopment,
softness of muscles, convulsions, and a life expectancy of about
four years. Plaintiff's parents were tested and given incorrect infor-
mation about their status as carriers of Tay-Sachs. The date of the
plaintiff's birth was unknown to the court thereby making it im-
89. Id. at 499-500.
90. Id. at 501.
91. Id. at 503.
92. Id. at 504, 508.
93. See id. at 512. See also Stribling v. de Quevedo, slip opinion (Pa. Super. Ct. Jan. 11,
1980) in which doctors were sued for failure of a tubal ligation resulting in plaintiff's con-
ception and birth with dextrocardia, a condition in which the heart is farther to the right
than normal. No cause of action was found on authority of Speck v. Finegold.
94. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
95. 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
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possible for the court to determine if the plaintiff's parents had
relied on the erroneous test results." Plaintiff sought damages for
cost of care, emotional distress, and deprivation of 72.6 years of life
as well as punitive damages." After reciting other wrongful life
cases in which a cause of action was denied due to the impossibil-
ity of measuring damages, the court stated:
Of some significance with respect to this question [of damages
in wrongful life actions] is the fact that in 1973, Roe v. Wade...
was decided by the United States Supreme Court. The nation's
high court determined that parents have a constitutionally pro-
tected right to obtain an abortion .... We deem this decision to
be of considerable importance in defining the parameters of
"wrongful-life" litigation."
While conceding that a cause of action based upon impairment of
status, as in the cases predicated on illegitimacy, should be denied
due to the absence of injury and damages consequential to that
injury, the court believed that a child born with severe impairment
presented a different situation because the necessary element of
injury was present. The facts of this case were characterized by the
court as a true wrongful life action-one brought by an infant
whose painful existence was the direct and proximate result of neg-
ligence by others." Neither the impossibility of recovery nor the
public policy in favor of life were viewed by the court as bars to a
finding that the defendants owed the plaintiff a duty to use ordi-
nary care in genetic testing. "The reality of the 'wrongful-life' con-
cept is that such a plaintiff both exists and suffers, due to the neg-
ligence of others. It is neither necessary nor just to retreat into
meditation on the mysteries of life." 100 Addressing the fear that
recognition of wrongful life actions would permit suit by infants
against their parents, the court found no sound public policy pro-
tecting parents from "being answerable for the pain, suffering and
misery which they have wrought upon their offspring." 101 In recog-
nizing the cause of action, however, the court rejected the claim for
damages based upon normal life expectancy, holding that damages
should be considered in light of plaintiff's mental and physical
96. Id. at 480.
97. Id. at 481.
98. Id. at 483 (citations omitted).
99. Id. at 486.
100. Id. at 488 (emphasis in original).
101. Id.
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condition at birth and her expected condition during her short life
expectancy. On the other hand, the court found no reason based
upon either public policy or legal analysis for rejecting claims for
punitive damages in such actions if the prerequisites could be
proved."0 2
If the Curlender decision survives the appellate process, its
ramifications are staggering. Not only could amniocentesis and
abortion become mandatory when a fetus is suspected of being less
than perfect, but parents could be drawn into actions against phy-
sicians for contributory negligence or contribution if they refused
anmiocentesis and/or abortion.
V. ABORTION AS A DEFENSE
Before Curlender bared this issue, several courts had alluded
to the availability of abortion as a defense in wrongful birth ac-
tions brought by parents against a physician. A logical extension of
this theory would be that in an action by an infant against a physi-
cian, the physician should be able to implead the parents on
grounds of contributory negligence for failure to consent to an
abortion. The first mention of this retaliatory action is found in
Judge Weintraub's dissenting opinion in Gleitman where he noted:
Implicit, beyond [the child's] claim against a physician ... is the
proposition that a pregnant woman [knowledgeable about the fe-
tus' deformities and not seeking] an abortion, and all who urge
her to see the pregnancy through, are guilty of wrongful injury to
the fetus, and .. .every day . . .the infant is sustained after
birth is a day of wrong. 08
In Troppi v. Scarf,104 parents sued a pharmacist for negligently
supplying the wrong drug to a mother who had requested oral con-
traceptives. The error resulted in the conception and birth of a
healthy child. The trial court entered summary judgment for de-
fendants reasoning that whatever damage plaintiff had suffered
was offset by the benefit of having a healthy child. 0 5 At the sug-
gestion that parents, who seek recovery for birth of an unwanted
child, should mitigate damages by placing the child for adoption,
the court stated that, "to impose such a duty upon the injured
102. Id. at 489, 490.
103. 227 A.2d at 711.
104. 187 N.W.2d 511, 512 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
105. Id. at 512-13.
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plaintiff is to ignore the very real difference which our law recog-
nizes between the avoidance of conception and the disposition of
the human organism after conception."10 6 In the wake of Roe and
Curlender's application of Roe to wrongful life actions, one might
be led to believe there no longer exists any great difference be-
tween the avoidance of conception and disposal of the human or-
ganism after conception but before birth. If this is so, the Troppi
rationale precluding the mitigation of damages in such an action
has been rendered obsolete.
Finally, in Rivera v. State,107 an unsuccessful tubal ligation re-
sulted in the conception and birth of a healthy child and a suit for
malpractice by the mother. The court found that a valid cause of
action had been pled and that the plaintiff's failure to abort did
not preclude recovery. The court said, "The right to have an abor-
tion may not be automatically converted to an obligation to have
one." 10 8 The court added:
[W]e are of the opinion that a rule of law which required claimant
to have an abortion would constitute an invasion of privacy of the
grossest and most pernicious kind .... Just as the law may not
impose the philosophy of one group upon the public at large,
neither may it permit the public to invade the province of the
individual in an area as private as sovereignty over one's body.
We find that claimant had no obligation to mitigate damages by
undergoing an abortion.10'
Despite a lack of authority allowing the availability of abortion as
a defense in wrongful life actions, a threat arises from Curlender
that a public interest in perfect babies may one day outweigh the
value of life, a value already severely jeopardized by Roe.
Curlender may lead to a philosophy contending that bodily inva-
sion is justified so that the parents of a less than perfect fetus must
abort it for the public good and to mitigate any damages created
by their negligence or the negligence of a physician.
A natural extension of this line of thought, of course, is infanti-
cide. In the wake of Roe, several physicians are now promoting the
idea that life protected by the Constitution should not begin at
birth but rather at some point thereafter. This would allow
106. Id. at 519.
107. 404 N.Y.S.2d 950 (Ct. C1. 1978).
108. Id. at 954 (quoting Ziemba v. Sternberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d 265, 269 (App. Div. 1974)).
109. Id.
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newborns to be evaluated for perfection before their constitutional
right to life attaches and disposed of if found wanting. ' " At the
extreme, almost to the point of absurdity, a remedy in wrongful
life actions could be developed that is less troublesome to the court
than the immeasurable damages issues. Rather than attempting to
measure life versus nonlife in dollars, the court could merely com-
mand execution of the unwanted or imperfect child who, according
to the alter ego of its parents who brought suit on its behalf,
wishes it were dead. 1' This extreme example merely demonstrates
the gravity of the Curlender decision and the complications it
could produce.
VI. CONCLUSION
So it is that with Roe the law traversed from a belief that life
began at conception and was legally protectable from that point, to
a decree holding that the precise time at which life begins is unim-
portant because life is not legally protectable until the child
breathes. This decree has arisen in the face of scientific informa-
tion that life begins at least at implantation. And with Curlender,
the right to privacy has been extended from a right to use contra-
ception in the privacy of the home to the brink of coerced eugenic
abortion.
If a cause of action for wrongful life is sustained, how do we
value a life for which damages are to be awarded? Economically? If
so, then we must ask whether an inmate in a home for the retarded
is a greater drain on societal resources than the average college
graduate. Or should the measure be usefulness to society? Using
this alternative we must ask ourselves who among us can be sure
that his or her life is useful to society. 12
While the cost of caring for those less fortunate is a continuing
110. "Would it seem so difficult for modern persons to withdraw care from the defective
newborn when they know that they might have done it only a few months earlier?" Fletcher,
Attitudes Toward Defective Newborns, 2 HAsTING CENrE STUD. 21 (1974). See Robertson,
Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns: A Legal Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 213
(1975). But see, Fletcher, Abortion, Euthanasia, and Care of Defective Newborns, 292 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 75 (1975). In essence the value of the newborn hinges on the subjective re-
sponse it stirs in other people, not on its intrinsic worth.
111. One indicia of what damages in dollars may be worth may be analogized from the
test tube baby trial in 1978 in which prospective parents were awarded $50,003 for destruc-
tion of their fertilized egg. Del Zio v. Vande Wiele, unreported case referred to in B. NA-
THANSON, supra note 3, at 215.
112. See Kass, Implications of Prenatal Diagnosis for the Human Right to Life, in ETH-
ICAL ISSUES IN HuMAN GENETIcs 185, 192-99 (1973).
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problem society must face, it should not be resolved by denigrating
the value of life. The result of the cases from Zepeda to Curlender
has been the development of an idea that if a fetus is suspected of
being mentally or physically deficient, or is even simply unwanted,
it should casually be discarded with no concern whatsoever to the
potential contributions the fetus might make after birth. The deci-
sion to be or not to be a member of the human community does
not rest with the fetus, but rather, the decision is with us to decide
to admit it to that community. No one is a human being by right
of nature but only by being recognized as such by his fellow
man.
113
113. Paraphrasing VERCORS, You SHALL KNOW THEM (1953).
